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Abstract 
In this paper we empirically compare the transaction costs from monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) of two environmental regulations directed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions: 
a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax and a tradable emissions system. We do this in the case of Sweden, where 
a set of firms are covered by both types of regulations, i.e., the Swedish CO2 tax and the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). This provides us with an excellent case study as it 
allows us to disentangle the costs of each regulation from other firm-specific variables that might 
affect the overall cost of MRV procedures. Our results indicate that the MRV costs of CO2 taxation do 
not depend on firms’ emissions, while they do in the case of the EU ETS. For firms of equivalent 
emissions’ size, the MRV costs are lower for CO2 taxation than for the EU ETS, which confirms the 
general view that regulating emissions upstream by means of a CO2 tax yields lower transaction costs 
vis-á-vis downstream regulation by means of emission trading. 
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1)  Introduction  
 Much of the literature acknowledges the lack of a generally accepted definition and the wide use 
of the concept of “transaction costs.” As pointed out by Krutilla and Krause (2010), in the 
environmental economics field, the term “transaction costs” first emerged in the literature on the 
Coase theorem to refer to the “costs of market transactions” following a rights assignment. Yet over 
the years the concept has been applied more expansively to account for the fact that environmental 
regulations establish use or quasi-ownership rights to polluters who are generally qualified for and 
subject to regulatory review or modification. In this context, “transaction costs” refer to the costs of 
the regulatory requirements implementing the policy objective. Moreover, it is acknowledged that the 
regulatory design can be used to reduce transaction costs by two means: excluding smaller participants 
who pay disproportionately large transaction costs in relation to their pollution, and choosing the point 
of obligation that minimizes transaction costs (Krutilla and Krause 2010, McCann 2013). For instance, 
when it comes to the climate change discussion, the general view is that regulating CO2 emissions 
upstream by means of a CO2 tax yields lower transaction costs than regulating polluters downstream 
through tradable emissions permits since the number of emitters is larger than the number of firms 
producing or importing fuel (Crals and Vereeck 2005, Metcalf and Weisbach 2009 and Mansur 2012). 
Moreover, the implementation costs are considered to be lower for a carbon tax than for a tradable 
permits system since the former makes use of existing social institutions, like tax-collecting organs 
and tax systems (Pope and Owen 2009, Kerr and Duscha 2014). 
Despite a growing body of research on the advantages of emissions taxation vis-à-vis emissions 
trading (with seminal papers by Weitzman 1974, Polinsky and Shavell 1982 and Stavins 1995, among 
others), there are no previous studies analyzing empirically whether emissions taxation entails lower 
transaction costs than emissions trading, mainly due to the absence of case studies where such a 
comparison is feasible. The present paper contributes to filling this gap by examining the case of 
Sweden, where a number of polluting firms have been subject to a CO2 tax since 1991 and to the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading System since 2005. From 2005 the policies have overlapped, 
implying that a large number of firms have complied with both regulations simultaneously. This 
provides us with an excellent case study as it allows us to measure transaction costs incurred by firms 
regulated by these two environmental policies and to disentangle transaction costs of a given policy 
from other firm-specific variables that might affect the costs themselves.  
To empirically compare the transaction costs of the CO2 tax and the EU ETS, we combine 
primary and secondary sources of information. Regarding the primary information, in 2013 we 
conducted a survey asking a relevant sample of Swedish firms a series of questions regarding the 
monitoring, reporting, and verification costs incurred as part of complying with the CO2 tax and/or the 
EU ETS in 2012. Following previous studies, we proxy transaction costs of regulations with the time 
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spent on these activities (internal costs) and the external and capital costs they entail (see McCann et 
al. 2005 for a review of methods to estimate transaction costs). The primary information was 
combined with other firm level data including data on CO2 emissions, employment and turnover.  
This combined dataset allows us to develop a comparative analysis of the transaction costs 
incurred by firms under emission taxes and tradable emission permits. It also enables us to identify 
differences across sectors, economies of scale, and the rationality for exclusion of smaller participants. 
From the perspective of firms, any regulation involves some implementation costs, including 
establishing internal/external administration for monitoring, reporting, and verification, quantifying 
emissions for the base period, familiarization with allocation rules, software and trading platforms. 
The focus of our analysis is on transaction costs from monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) 
of emissions since empirical evidence indicates that these costs, at least in the case of the EU ETS, are 
the most important costs of compliance, with a share that might exceed 70% of the total transaction 
costs (see e.g., Jaraitė et. al 2010 and Heindl 2012). Hence, our study does not concern 
implementation costs as both the CO2 tax and the EU ETS have been in place for many years. 
Our results provide empirical support to the claim that transaction costs from MRV are larger 
under emissions trading than carbon taxation. Our findings also point to different cost structures under 
the two policies: MRV costs do not vary with firms’ emissions in the case of carbon taxation while 
they do in the case of the EU ETS. By comparing firms of similar emissions’ size we find that the 
MRV costs are lower for the carbon tax than the EU ETS, which confirms the general view that 
regulating emissions upstream by means of a CO2 tax yields lower transaction costs vis-á-vis 
downstream regulation by means of an emissions trading system. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the Swedish CO2 tax and 
the EU ETS, as well as the main MRV procedures of these policies. In Section 3, we discuss the 
theoretical aspects of MRV transaction costs. In Section 4, we present the data and compare the 
estimated MRV costs between policies. Finally, Section 5 synthesizes our findings and concludes the 
paper. 
 
2) The Swedish CO2 Tax and the EU ETS 
 In 1991, Sweden implemented the world’s highest CO₂ tax, which is directly connected to the 
carbon content of the fuel.1 Initially, it was equivalent to €25/tCO₂. After increasing steadily over the 
last decade, at present it corresponds to €105/tCO₂. Since the tax is very high and Sweden is a small 
open economy, there has been quite some concern about the competitiveness of some energy-intensive 
                                                          
1 There is some differentiation among sectors. For example, there is no carbon tax on electricity production but 
non-industrial consumers have to pay a tax on electricity consumption. 
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industries. Thus, a number of deductions and exemptions were created for sectors that are open to 
competition, and a series of reduced rates were applied. For example, Lundgren and Marklund (2010) 
indicate that during the period 1990-2004, the effective CO₂ tax rate was on average €11/tCO₂; the 
CO₂ tax varied considerably across sectors, ranging from about €4/tCO₂ in the wood product sector to 
almost €15/tCO₂ in the food sector. They also find that there is no particular pattern in or relationship 
between the cost shares of energy and/or fuels and the actual CO₂ tax paid by firms, i.e., high use of 
CO₂-emitting inputs does not necessarily mean a high CO₂ tax payment.   
 From January 2011 onwards, industrial installations were exempted from the CO₂ tax for those 
activities covered by the EU ETS. The same exemption applied to combined heat and power 
production from 2013 onwards.2 Nevertheless, from 2005 to 2012, the CO2 tax and the EU ETS 
overlapped, implying that firms included in the EU ETS also had to pay a percentage of the CO2 tax.3  
 Though the CO2 tax applies to the fuel used by all industrial consumers, in our study we focus 
only on the firms that file and pay the CO2 tax to the Swedish Tax Authority (the firms referred to as 
warehouse or stock keepers)4. These firms sell fuel to final consumers, adding on the CO2 tax to the 
price consumers pay. These firms may use fuel themselves too, paying and refunding the tax payments 
related to their consumption completely or partially. When it comes to the MRV requirements, to 
comply with the CO2 tax regulation, the warehouse/stock keepers must apply for authorization from 
the Swedish Tax Agency (STA) to purchase, extract, process, and store fuel. Tax liabilities arise when 
warehouse keepers consume the fuel or sell the fuel product to a non-authorized party or if the fuel is 
transferred to the firms’ own retail store for further sale. The warehouse keepers must keep records of 
fuel handling on a monthly basis and report to the authorities, implying an administrative burden. If 
the fuel is sold to a non-authorized party, the firm must keep records of the buyer and provide 
information about the buyer’s tax status, which is available from the authorities.5 The authorized 
warehouse keepers must secure payment of the tax in advance. To this end, the tax is calculated and 
reported together with the application for authorization. Moreover, they shall record all purchasing and 
sales of fuel, all transfers of fuel products, and are obliged to take inventory on a regular basis (SKV 
531 2012; SKV 663 2013; and SKV 524 and 543 2014).  
The STA can make visits to ensure that the warehouse keepers comply with regulations. 
Otherwise, tax compliance is monitored through random tax audits conducted by the tax authorities. 
The tax agency can also conduct select audits if they suspect that a firm has misreported taxes. Before 
                                                          
2 Petrol and unmarked oil are not exempted from CO2 tax, which is mainly used for transportation purposes. 
3 Since the price of the EU ETS permits was much lower than the Swedish carbon tax level, this harmonization 
with the EU actually implied a sizeable fall in the price of carbon emissions for most firms (see Bonilla et al. 
2012 for details). 
4 For fuels regulated through EU legislation (EU harmonized fuels), an authorized firm is called an authorized 
warehouse keeper while for the nationally regulated fuels (non-EU harmonized fuels) it is called a stock keeper. 
5 The last day for filing taxes varies between the twelfth day after the end of an accounting period and the twelfth 
day in the second month after the end of the accounting period. 
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an audit, the authorities notify the firm in order for it to have all required documents accessible upon 
the visit. An audit report declares the results of the audit and suggests tax changes, if needed. If a firm 
is found misreporting taxes, it can either be subject to administrative penalties issued by the tax 
authorities themselves or – in more serious cases of tax evasion – prosecuted in court.    
The EU ETS is thus far the largest emissions trading system in the world. It covers about 12,000 
installations, representing approximately 45% of the EU’s CO2 emissions. In Sweden, the sectors 
included in the EU ETS account for 38% of the country’s total CO2 emissions (Löfgren et al. 2013). 
These sectors correspond to manufacture of (i) wood and wood products; (ii) rubber and plastic 
products; (iii) machinery and equipment; (iv) fabricated metal products and motor vehicles; and (iv) 
trailers and semi‐trailers. In addition, all installations in the heat and power sector with a rated thermal 
input exceeding 20 MW are included in the EU ETS. According to Jaraitė et al. (2013), the number of 
Swedish installations currently included is the EU ETS is 853, corresponding to 273 firms as some 
firms own several installations.  
Regarding monitoring, reporting, and verifications activities, annual reports are mandatory and 
must be verified by an accredited verifier, which regulated firms have to pay for. In particular, each 
firm in the EU ETS is required to measure and supervise all of its CO2 emissions in accordance with 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency’s (SEPA) regulations. Each year by March 31, each 
firm must report its CO2 emissions, have the report verified by an independent accredited verifier, and 
input its yearly emissions in the Swedish emission rights system. Finally, each year by April 30, each 
firm is required to surrender its emission rights corresponding to its actual emissions for the preceding 
year. The handover shall be done in accordance with the manual provided by the Swedish Energy 
Agency. Any firm that does not surrender sufficient tradable emission rights by 30 April of each year 
to cover its emission during the preceding year is liable for payment of an excess emissions penalty. 
The current penalty is €100 for each ton of carbon dioxide emitted for which the firm has not 
surrendered permits (European Parliament and Council 2008).   
Note that the procedures for MRV under both regulations are independent. Not only must 
Swedish firms report to different authorities (STA vs. SEPA), but the MRV requirements are defined 
in terms of different measurement units (fuel handling vs. verified emissions) and different time 
frames (monthly vs. annual reporting). 
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3) Model 
 Transaction costs of pollution control affect both the efficient level of emissions reductions and 
the choice of policy instruments. To facilitate the comparison of policy instruments, let us focus on 
aggregate abatement of CO2 emissions per unit of time, 𝐸, which corresponds to the sum of emissions 
𝑒𝑖 from 𝑁 regulated firms (𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁). Let us consider a social planner whose objective is to achieve 
an emissions cap 𝐸∗ at minimum cost. Let the function 𝐷(𝐸) represent the damages from emissions in 
monetary units. We follow convention and assume that the damage function is increasing in emissions 
such that 𝐷′(𝐸) > 0. We define the cost of pollution reduction for firm 𝑖 by the cost function 𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖). If 
the firm is not compelled to reduce its emissions below its unregulated level ?̂?𝑖, the cost of pollution 
control is zero (i.e., 𝐶𝑖(?̂?𝑖) = 0). Conversely, 𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖) is positive for any emission level 𝑒𝑖 < ?̂?𝑖. We also 
assume that the costs of pollution control are lower when emissions are higher so that 𝐶′𝑖(𝑒𝑖) ≤ 0. Let 
the function 𝑇𝑖(𝑒𝑖) represent the firm’s 𝑖 regulatory costs (monitoring, reporting, and verification) 
associated with the policy instrument chosen to implement the cap on emissions 𝐸∗. By analogy to the 
costs of pollution control, we assume that 𝑇𝑖(𝑒𝑖) is positive for any emission level 𝑒𝑖 < ?̂?𝑖 and that 
𝑇′𝑖(𝑒𝑖) ≤ 0. The total cost of an environmental regulation for firm 𝑖  then corresponds to 𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖) plus 
𝑇𝑖(𝑒𝑖). 
The efficient emission level for each firm is found by minimizing the total cost of the 
externality to society. 
(1)   𝑆𝐶(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛) = 𝐷(𝐸) + ∑ 𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑇𝑖(𝑒𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1 . 
 Differentiating equation (1) with respect to each individual emissions 𝑒𝑖, we obtain: 
(2)  𝐷′(𝐸) = −𝐶′𝑖(𝑒𝑖) − 𝑇′𝑖(𝑒𝑖)  ∀ 𝑖. 
Equation (2) can be used to further show that 
(3)  −𝐶′𝑖(𝑒𝑖) − 𝑇′𝑖(𝑒𝑖) = −𝐶′𝑘(𝑒𝑘) − 𝑇′𝑘(𝑒𝑘)  ∀ 𝑖,𝑘 = 1, …𝑁, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘. 
 Equations (2) and (3) illustrate two fundamental characteristics of an optimal allocation of 
pollution: for each firm the marginal damage from pollution is equal to the sum of the marginal cost of 
pollution control and the marginal transaction cost. Moreover, a necessary condition for social cost 
minimization is that the marginal cost of an environmental regulation is the same among all firms that 
carry out positive levels of emissions control.  
 From Equation (2) it is also clear that if marginal transaction costs are nonzero (i.e., 
𝑇𝑖′(𝑒𝑖) ≠ 0), the efficient emission level for each firm is higher than in the absence of transaction 
costs. Moreover, the presence of a fixed component of cost in the transaction cost function 𝑇𝑖(𝑒𝑖) 
implies the existence of scale economies in regulatory compliance. In such a case, it might be optimal 
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to exempt smaller firms to reduce the social cost of environmental regulation (Brock and Evans 1985). 
Let ?̃?  denote the emissions’ threshold at which the total transaction costs of regulating a firm equalize 
the welfare gains from regulation, i.e, 𝐷(?̃? ) = −𝐶𝑖(?̃? ) − 𝑇𝑖(?̃? ).  Hence, an exemption should be 
available for a particular firm emitting 𝑒𝑖 < ?̃?  units of emissions to avoid situations where the benefits 
of regulation (i.e., reduced social cost of emissions) exceeds the regulatory costs. 
We do not attempt to define the functional forms in these formulas. Fortunately, we know that 
the damages should only depend on the level of emissions. Moreover, taxes and tradable permits are 
equivalent economic instruments in terms of pollution control cost efficiency, and hence, regardless of 
the exact nature of the cost function 𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖), the costs of pollution control for a given firm should be the 
same for the two of them. However, there is no theoretical reason to believe that both instruments 
entail the same transaction costs 𝑇𝑖(𝑒𝑖) to firms or that they have a common structure (e.g., see 
discussion by Stavins 1995). Thus, the comparison between CO2 taxes and tradable permits in this 
setting comes down to empirically comparing the transaction costs of the policies. From Equation (2) 
it is clear that if the marginal transaction costs of these policies are not the same, the optimal level of 
pollution control for the policy with the largest marginal transaction costs is lower. In addition, in the 
presence of scale economies in regulatory compliance, the optimal number of firms regulated under 
each policy will not be the same: more firms should be exempted from the regulation with the largest 
transaction cost.  Hence, by comparing the total transaction costs of taxes and permits for smaller 
emitters, we can determine which policy is more costly to them.  
It is often argued that carbon taxation implies lower administrative and compliance costs than 
emissions trading since consumption of fuel usually is much easier to monitor than emissions. 
Moreover, carbon taxation can be administered through government tax collection institutions that are 
more established and effective than environmental regulatory institutions (see, e.g., Coria 2009 and 
Pope and Owen 2009). However, there is no study that empirically compares the functional forms of 
transaction costs between CO2 taxes and tradable emissions permits. Hence, to fill this gap and to be 
able to compare these policies, we need the answers to the following questions: 
1) Are the total MRV transaction costs higher under the EU ETS than CO2 taxation? 
2) Do the total MRV transaction costs under CO2 taxation and the EU ETS increase with the 
level of emissions? 
3) Are there any positive spillover effects (or learning-by-doing) for the MRV costs from the 
interaction of CO2 taxation and the EU ETS? 
4) Do the transaction costs for a given policy differ across sectors? 
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In the subsequent sections we first describe the data we use to answer these questions and then present 
the results.  
 
4) Data 
To develop the empirical analysis described above, we need to combine primary and secondary 
sources of information. Regarding the primary information, after a set of exploratory interviews with 
policymakers and firms, we developed a questionnaire and conducted a survey (in collaboration with 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency) from late April to September 2013.6 We asked a 
sample of Swedish firms a series of questions regarding the monitoring, reporting, and verification 
costs incurred as part of their compliance with the CO2 tax and/or the EU ETS in 2012.  
The sample consisted of 379 firms covered under the Swedish CO2 taxation and/or the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in 2012. Two hundred and twenty-three of 
these firms were registered as authorized warehouse keepers by the Swedish Tax Agency (around 
58.8%), 264 were included in the EU ETS (around 69.7%), and 108 (around 28.5%) were covered by 
both policies and were thus registered as authorized warehouse keepers and included in the EU ETS in 
the same year. In total, 130 firms completed the survey (approximately 34.3%). Of the firms that 
responded, 67 (51.5%) were both authorized warehouse keepers and in the EU ETS in 2012 and 23 
(17.7%) stated that they were authorized warehouse keepers but not in the EU ETS. The remaining 40 
firms (30.8%) stated to be in the EU ETS but not registered as warehouse keepers in 2012 (see Table 
1). 
Table 1: Survey Respondents  
 
Sources: The survey and the authors’ calculations. 
To complement the data gathered through our survey, we collected additional information from 
various sources including the total CO2 tax payments from the STA, verified CO2 emissions under the 
EU ETS from the European Union Transaction Log, and number of employees, turnover, and size 
categories from the Orbis database (which classifies firms as small, medium, large, or very large 
depending on a series of criteria regarding operation revenues, total assets, and number of 
                                                          
6 The exploratory interviews took place from November 2012 to February 2013.  
CO2 Tax Firms 
EU ETS 
Firms 
 No Yes Total 
No 0 23 23 
Yes 40 67 107 
Total 40 90 130 
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employees).7 Finally, we collected information on the sector codes (SNI), fuel mix, fuel quantity and 
CO2 emissions from fuel combustion from Statistics Sweden (SCB). Disentangling CO2 emissions 
from fuel combustion is important since even if carbon taxation overall implies lower administrative 
and compliance costs, emissions trading might lead to larger emissions reductions as it is based on a 
broader definition of source stream. Thus, under the EU ETS definition, a source stream includes all 
fuel or material that enters and leaves the installation and has a direct impact on emissions (Directive 
2003/87/EC). In the simplest case it means the fuels streaming into the installation. However, it also 
covers raw materials that give rise to process emissions (which are included in the calculation of GHG 
emissions using a mass balance method). 
Although we contacted all relevant firms, response rates can always introduce some bias as 
firms willing to answer may be distinct from the average. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for 
the contacted firms and those that actually completed the survey. It is evident that the latter group 
includes a larger share of firms that are subject to both regulations and a larger share of firms that 
belong to the energy sector. This needs to be taken into account yet is not necessarily unexpected or 
negative. The regulations are complex and the firms that were subject to both CO2 taxation and the EU 
ETS might have felt they had more to contribute. From a statistical point of view, the information 
provided by these double-regulated firms is very valuable as it allows disentangling the costs of each 
regulation from other firm-specific variables (e.g., management or organizational structure) that might 
affect the overall cost of MRV procedures regardless of the regulation in place.  
Regarding size, besides the size categories from the Orbis database, we grouped the firms into 
three categories according to their verified CO2 emissions under the EU ETS relative to the total 
verified emissions of the whole country. Thus, small emitters are those whose emissions represent up 
to 0.1% of the country total, medium emitters are in the 0.1–1% range, and large emitters have 
emissions corresponding to more than 1% of the country’s total verified emissions. As shown in Table 
2, most firms in our sample and most of the respondents are classified as small emitters in this respect. 
This is consistent with the fact that the EU ETS is dominated by very few large emitters and a large 
number of smaller emitters (e.g., see a report by the European Commission and Ecofys 2007). 
  
                                                          
7 For example, firms in Orbis are considered to be large when they match at least one of the following 
conditions: operational revenue higher than 10 million euro, total assets higher than 20 million euro, and more 
than 150 employees. Similar definitions apply for medium and very large firms, while those that are not included 
in another category are classified as small firms. 
Table 2: Summary of the Descriptive Statistics, 2012 
 
Variable Unit 
Sample 
 
Respondents CO2 Tax 
Firms 
EU ETS Firms Double-Regulated 
Firms 
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
CO2 tax firms3 Dummy 379 0.588 130 0.692 90 1.000 107 0.626 67 1.000 
EU ETS firms2 Dummy 379 0.696 130 0.823 90 0.744 107 1.000 67 1.000 
CO2 tax & EU ETS firms2,3 Dummy 379 0.285 130 0.515 90 0.744 107 0.626 67 1.000 
Energy sector firms1 Dummy 379 0.346 130 0.500 90 0.444 107 0.551 67 0.507 
CO2 emissions, fuel 
combustion1 
Ton 244 65 528 103 61 525 70 74 206 95 63 767 62 80 407 
Verified CO2 emissions 2 Ton 264 69 994 111 65 871 71 67 197 106 67 827 66 70 484 
Total CO2 tax payments3 Million EUR 379 8.515 130 3.978 90 5.731 107 0.525 67 0.819 
Turnover4 Million EUR 357 417.931 123 240.496 86 282.484 102 227.259 65 275.278 
Total assets4 Million EUR 335 577.558 118 648.917 81 611.549 95 396.958 58 184.038 
Fixed tangible assets4 Million EUR 338 234.491 119 157.995 83 200.494 99 180.109 63 248.736 
Employees4 Number 353 932 121 456 85 415 100 533 64 521 
Small firms ORBIS4 Dummy  378 0.034 130 0.015 90 0.011 107 0.009 67 0.000 
Medium firms ORBIS4 Dummy 378 0.138 130 0.123 90 0.078 107 0.112 67 0.045 
Large firms ORBIS4 Dummy 378 0.423 130 0.508 90 0.478 107 0.501 67 0.462 
Very large firms ORBIS4 Dummy 378 0.405 130 0.354 90 0.433 107 0.374 67 0.492 
Small CO2 emitter Dummy 264 0.720 111 0.685 71 0.563 106 0.679 66 0.545 
Medium CO2 emitter Dummy 264 0.216 111 0.243 71 0.338 106 0.245 66 0.348 
Large CO2 emitter Dummy 264 0.006 111 0.072 71 0.098 106 0.075 66 0.106 
(1) Sources: 1) Swedish Statistics; 2) European Union Transaction Log; 3) Swedish Tax Authority; 4) Orbis database. 
  
5) The Results 
In what follows, we discuss the survey responses and the answers to the questions raised in 
Section 3.  
5.1 Comparing Transaction Costs under CO2 taxation and the EU ETS 
Table 3 presents the MRV costs for three groups of firms: (1) all firms subject to the MRV 
requirements of the CO2 tax, (2) all firms subject to the MRV requirements of the EU ETS, and (3) 
firms subject to the MRV requirements of both regulations. In Table 3, the three groups are denoted 
CO2 tax all firms, EU ETS all firms and double regulation, respectively. We have consistently 
excluded outliers and firms reporting no costs.8  
As Jaraitė et al. (2010), in our analysis we consider three types of MRV costs: (1) internal costs, 
mainly management and staff time, measured as the number of full-time working days spent on all 
MRV procedures; (2) external costs incurred in terms of consultancy services taken in to be MRV 
compliant, measured in monetary terms; and (3) capital costs, meaning emissions/fuel measurement, 
monitoring, recording, and data storage equipment needed to comply, measured in monetary terms. In 
Table 3 we report all these types of MRV costs, which we denote as MRV1 (internal costs), MRV2 (the 
sum of internal and external costs) and MRV3 (the sum of internal, external and capital costs).9  
From Table 3 it is clear that firms spent a significant amount of time on MRV procedures and 
that there is a large range of variation in the number of full-time working days spent on all MRV 
procedures by firms in the sample. On average, firms spent more time on MRV procedures under the 
EU ETS than under CO2 taxation (e.g., 38.8 vs. 30.9 days). Nevertheless, according to the non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, this difference is not statistically significant (p-value = 
0.165). The difference in internal costs is, however, much larger and statistically significant (p-value = 
0.010) when we look at the sample of firms subject to both regulations (on average, 33.8 vs. 51.4 
days). This is to say that for exactly the same firms, the MRV procedures under the CO2 tax take, on 
average, 18 days less than those under the EU ETS. This finding suggests that the MRV requirements 
are more demanding to comply with under the EU ETS. In addition, when we compare the sample of 
all firms with the subsample of firms subject to both policies, we see that the firms in the latter group 
spend on average more time on MRV procedures. The difference in time spent is only statistically 
significant in the case of the EU ETS (on average, 38.8 vs. 51.4, p-value = 0.074). Firms subject to 
both regulations are larger than those in the EU ETS all firms group, which might explain this result. 
                                                          
8 We define a firm as an outlier if its reported MRV costs in terms of full-time working days are higher than 500. 
In this case, two warehouse keepers were dropped from the sample. Six firms that reported zero full-time 
working days either for the CO2 tax, EU ETS, or both were also excluded from the analysis. 
9 The internal costs from total full-time days were converted in monetary terms by assuming eight hours of full-
time working day and multiplying these hours by the average hourly wage of a qualified employee working on 
environmental activities in Sweden. 
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Moreover, this finding points to a lack of learning-by-doing or synergies between the MRV 
procedures under the two regulations.  
 The cost wedge between the two policies remains when we compare the total costs of the time 
spent on internal MRV procedures plus external and capital costs. In both cases (e.g., MRV2 and 
MRV3), the cost wedge is statistically significant when we compare the CO2 tax all firms group and 
the EU ETS all firms group. Hence, external and capital costs seem to be higher in the case of the EU 
ETS, which increases the wedge between the two policies so it becomes statistically significant (p-
value = 0.000 for both MRV2 and MRV3). The cost wedge between the two policies is also statistically 
significant when we analyze the sample of firms that are subject to both regulations (p-value = 0.000 
for both MRV2 and MRV3).  
 
Table 3: MRV Costs for CO2 Taxation and the EU ETS  
 N Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Full-time working days spent on all MRV procedures, MRV1 
Cost CO2 tax all firms    80 30.9 44.2 0.75 215 
Cost EU ETS all firms  104 38.8 63.0 1 372 
Cost CO2 tax double regulation   59 33.8 49.5 1.5 215 
Cost EU ETS double regulation 59 51.4 77.1 6 372 
Sum of the cost of full-time working days spent on all MRV procedures plus 
external costs in thousand EUR, MRV2 
Cost CO2 tax all firms    80 12.7 17.6 0.264 97.9 
Cost EU ETS all firms  104 23.2 29.7 1.056 166.1 
Cost CO2 tax double regulation   59 13.7 19.9 0.528 97.9 
Cost EU ETS double regulation 59 29.7 36.0 2.464 166.1 
Sum of the cost of full-time working days spent on all MRV procedures plus 
external and capital costs in thousand EUR, MRV3 
Cost CO2 tax all firms    80 15.0 22.2 0.264 114.6 
Cost EU ETS all firms  104 26.5 36.3 1.056 221.7 
Cost CO2 tax double regulation   59 16.7 25.2 0.528 114.6 
Cost EU ETS double regulation 59 34.1 44.7 2.464 221.7 
Sources: The survey and the authors’ calculations. 
Table 4 presents the breakdown of internal MRV costs of CO2 taxation and the EU ETS for the 
sample of firms subject to the MRV requirements of both regulations. We report the breakdown 
estimated as the number of full-time working days spent on monitoring, reporting, and verification, 
respectively, relative to the total number of full-time working days spent on all MRV procedures. It 
also shows the breakdown of total MRV costs reported by the firms. Clearly, these two breakdowns 
might differ since the former only includes internal costs (measured as number of full working days), 
while the latter also includes total MRV costs (in thousand EUR). At any rate, it is clear that the 
largest differences between the studied policies are related to the costs of verification. That is, in 
relative terms, the costs of verification are larger under the EU ETS. Firms regulated under the EU 
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ETS spend a significant amount of resources not only hiring external certified verifiers but also on 
internal verification, which is used as an input by external verifiers. Moreover, the resources devoted 
to reporting are (in relative terms) larger under CO2 taxation, which might be explained by the fact that 
reporting under this regulation occurs on a monthly basis, while under the EU ETS firms have to 
report their emissions only once a year. Finally, in all cases monitoring is the activity that makes up 
the largest share of the MRV costs. Most of our respondents monitor fuel consumption and/or CO2 
emissions on a monthly basis. This is expected in the case of CO2 taxation as it coincides with the 
frequency of the reporting. In the case of the EU ETS, firms monitor emissions more often than the 
required frequency of the reporting. A frequent monitoring might allow them to anticipate and adjust 
their purchases/sales of permits to ensure compliance with the regulation. 
Table 4: Breakdown of the MRV Cost for CO2 Taxation and the EU ETS 
 Estimated Breakdown of 
Internal MRV Costs (%) 
 Reported Breakdown of  
Total MRV Costs (%) 
 N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. 
CO2 Tax 
Monitoring 59 53.1 18.4 56 45.9 19.6 
Reporting 59 39.7 17.0 56 42.5 20.4 
Verification 59 7.1 15.5 56 11.6 16.4 
EU ETS 
Monitoring 59 46.9 22.1 58 39.6 21.0 
Reporting 59 30.5 17.0 58 29.8 18.2 
Verification 59 22.6 13.9 58 30.6 21.3 
 Sources: The survey and the authors’ calculations.  
As mentioned before, the EU ETS is based on a broader definition of source stream, as it 
includes the emissions from not only fuel combustion (covered under the CO2 tax) but also raw 
materials. Hence, even if the total MRV costs are larger under the EU ETS than under CO2 taxation, 
the cost per unit of emissions might be lower under the former policy as it covers a larger amount of 
emissions. To account for this, Table 5 reports our three measures of MRV cost (in thousand EUR) per 
ton of CO2 emissions, where emissions under CO2 taxation correspond to those provided by SBC (fuel 
combustion) and emissions under the EU ETS correspond to the verified emissions reported to the 
European Union Transaction Log.10  
Note that, with regard to Table 3, the number of observations in each group decreases since 
information on CO2 emissions is unfortunately not available for all firms in our sample. However, 
from Table 5 it is clear that the differences in MRV costs between the two policies remain even after 
dividing them by emissions. In all cases, the MRV cost per ton of CO2 emissions is statistically higher 
under the EU ETS than under CO2 taxation both when we compare the sample of all firms subject to 
                                                          
10 The verified average emissions for the sub-sample of 54 firms that are subject to double regulation correspond 
to 69 699 tons of CO2. That is, in this group 99% of the total emissions stem from fuel combustion. 
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the CO2 tax and the sample of all firms subject to the EU ETS and when looking at the sample of firms 
subject to both regulations.11 If we focus, e.g., on the firms that are subject to both regulations, we can 
see that the average MRV1 cost is equal to 6.6 €/tCO2 under CO2 taxation and 9.2 €/tCO2 under the EU 
ETS. If we consider also external costs, these figures increase to 9.1 €/tCO2 and 16.5 €/tCO2, 
respectively. These costs are by all means high if we compare them with the actual price of CO2 
emissions under both policies. For instance, the price of the EU ETS permits was persistently under 10 
€/tCO2,while the effective CO2 tax rate over the period 1990-2004 corresponded to around 11 €/tCO2. 
 
Table 5: MRV Cost, €/tCO2 
 N Emissions MRV1/tCO2 MRV2/tCO2 MRV3/tCO2 
 
Cost CO2 tax all firms    61 66 231 6.4 
(28.2)2 
9.3 
(40.4) 
9.4 
(40.4) 
Cost EU ETS all firms  101 70 052 10.6 
(32.1) 
37.6 
(203.0) 
38.3 
(203.0) 
Cost CO2 tax double regulation   54 69 0681 6.6 
(29.9) 
9.1 
 (42.3) 
9.3 
(42.4) 
Cost EU ETS double regulation 57 66 406  9.2 
(33.1) 
16.5 
(61.8) 
17.1 
(61.8) 
Sources: The survey and the authors’ calculations. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
 In sum, our results indicate that the MRV costs are substantial and exceed the current prices of 
CO2 emissions. This is by all means a surprising finding, especially if one considers that most studies 
analyzing or comparing environmental regulations disregards the role of transaction costs.. Moreover, 
the costs related to MRV activities under the EU ETS are higher than the costs under CO2 taxation. 
The difference is even larger when we look at the group of firms subject to the MRV requirements of 
both regulations.  
 
5.2 Economies of Scale under CO2 Taxation and the EU ETS 
Table 6 reports the carbon intensity (defined as the ratio of verified CO2 emissions in the EU 
ETS to turnover) and the sum of internal and external MRV costs per ton of emissions for small, 
medium, and large emitters, where as described in Section 4 these categories are based on the firms’ 
                                                          
11 For MRV1, the difference in the cost per ton of CO2 emissions is statistically significant at p-value = 0.000 
when we compare the sample of all firms paying the CO2 tax with the sample of all firms paying the EU ETS. 
The P-value is 0.010 when we look at the sample of firms that are subject to both regulations. For MRV2 and 
MRV3, the difference in the cost per ton of CO2 emissions is statistically significant at p-value = 0.000 in all 
cases. 
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emissions as a proportion of the whole country’s total verified emissions. We focus on the sum of 
internal and external costs since, as pointed out earlier, external costs are quite relevant in the case of 
the EU ETS due to external verification requirements. Moreover, we exclude capital costs since they 
are time specific and do not occur on a regular basis. 
 
Table 6: MRV2 for Small, Medium, and Large Emitters 
 CO2 Tax all firms EU ETS all firms 
 
 N Mean N Mean 
Small firms 
CO2 intensity (tCO2/th EUR) 35 0.107 65 0.096 
MRV2 (thousand EUR) 37 10.7 72 19.1 
MRV2 €/tCO2 36 26.5 70 54.1 
Medium firms 
CO2 intensity (tCO2/th EUR) 24 0.906 25 0.901 
MRV2(thousand EUR) 20 12.6 23 24.1 
MRV2 €/tCO2 20 0.24 23 0.53 
Large firms 
CO2 intensity (tCO2/th EUR) 6 3.014 8 3.660 
MRV2 (thousand EUR) 6 28.6 8 49.7 
MRV2 €/tCO2 6 0.08 8 0.10 
Sources: The survey and the authors’ calculations. 
 
From Table 6 we can observe that while, on average, the total MRV2 costs are larger for the 
largest firms in all cases (both under CO2 taxation and under the EU ETS), the MRV2 cost per ton of 
CO2 emissions is the largest for the smallest firms. Similar patterns were observed by Jaraitė et al. 
(2010) in the case of Irish firms under the EU ETS. Also, we can observe that for all firm categories, 
the MRV2 costs are larger for firms under the EU ETS.  
Since we have very few large firms in our sample, we merge firms into two groups in order to test 
whether the cost differences are statistically significant. Thus, we classify firms as small and large 
(where the large firms correspond to the medium and large firms in the table). Interestingly, we find 
that the cost difference between small and large firms is only statistically significant in the case of the 
firms regulated under the EU ETS (p-value = 0.001). However, we observe that under both regulations 
the MRV cost per unit of emissions is statistically (and not surprisingly) lower in the case of the large 
firms (p-value = 0.000).  
Our findings indicate that under CO2 taxation, size does not affect the total MRV costs. This is 
consistent with a cost structure characterized by a fixed component that can be denoted 𝐹𝑇, where the 
total cost of MRV does not depend on size but the cost per unit of emissions does. In contrast, the 
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statistical evidence in the case of the EU ETS points out to a cost structure of the type 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑡(𝑒), 
where 𝐹𝑃 corresponds to the fixed component and 𝑡(𝑒) to a variable component that increases with 
emissions at a decreasing rate. Thus, our results point out to a different structure of the transaction 
costs of the policies under analysis. By comparing firms of a similar size, we can argue that 𝐹𝑇 < 𝐹𝑃 +
𝑡(𝑒) both for small and large firms, implying that for small emitters the transaction costs of CO2 
taxation are lower than those under the EU ETS. Furthermore, despite the existence of economies of 
scale, the costs of MRV activities under the CO2 tax remain smaller than under the EU ETS even for 
large firms.12  
To analyze the extent to which transaction costs depend on emissions, we estimate a simple OLS 
model where the empirical specification corresponds to: 
(3)  log(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖) = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑒𝑖 + +𝛼3𝑒𝑖2 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖. 
We estimate the model for our three measures of MRV costs (e.g., MRV1, MRV2, and MRV3, all 
expressed in the same measurement units as in Table 3). The explanatory variables include emissions 
𝑒𝑖 (which in the case of CO2 taxation correspond to emissions from fuel combustion and in the case of 
the EU ETS correspond to verified emissions), a matrix 𝑋𝑖  of firm characteristics, which serve as 
control variables (including sector, turnover, number of employees and whether the firm is subject to 
double regulation), and an error term 𝜖𝑖, which is normally distributed 𝑁~(0,𝜎2). Regarding sector, 
we grouped firms into two categories: energy and non-energy firms.13 
Note that in our specification, emissions enter the regression in a non-linear way to test for 
economies of scale. A similar specification was employed by Heindl (2012) to test for economies of 
scale on the transactions costs of the EU ETS for a sample of German companies. 
The results of our OLS models are presented in Table 7. For all OLS estimations, the robust 
standard errors were calculated as they take into account the potential heterogeneity and lack of 
normality of the data. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests comparing the MRV costs per unit of emissions between CO2 
taxation and the EU ETS for small and large firms support this statement (p-value = 0.011 in the case of small 
firms and p-value = 0.020 in the case of large firms). The results of the tests should, however, be interpreted with 
caution since they are based on the small sample sizes. 
13 Energy firms correspond to the NACE code 35 and non-energy firms correspond to all the other NACE codes.  
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Table 7: OLS Estimation of MRV Costs1 
Notes: 1. p < 0.05 is denoted * and p < 0.01 is denoted **. 2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
In line with Heindl’s (2012) results and the results of the statistical analysis above, the 
regression analysis supports the existence of economies of scale in the case of the EU ETS. Our three 
measures of MRV costs are non-linear in emissions: they increase with emissions at a decreasing rate. 
In addition (and also in line with the statistical analysis in the previous section), firms subject to both 
regulations have higher MRV costs than those that are subject only to the MRV requirements of the 
EU ETS. As mentioned earlier, this finding seems to reflect the fact that these firms are larger, yet it 
also points to the lack of learning-by-doing effects and synergy effects between the MRV 
requirements of both policies. Consequently, regulation overlap has implied duplication of transaction 
costs compared with what the costs could have been with only one policy. In principle, the policies are 
based on different measurement units (fuel handling vs. verified emissions) and it might be difficult to 
integrate an emissions trading scheme with the existing tax system. However, the transaction costs of 
both policies are high, especially when one compares them with the actual cost of the carbon tax and 
the price of the EU ETS permits. The recommendation would then be to avoid such policy overlapping 
when possible.  
Another interesting result is that the transaction costs are decreasing with the number of 
employees in the case of the EU ETS. This might suggest that firms that are large in terms of 
personnel have more experience complying with environmental regulations and hence incur lower 
transaction costs. The opposite results were reported by Heindl (2012) in the case of German firms in 
Variables MRV1 MRV2 MRV3 
 CO2 tax  
all firms 
EU ETS  
all firms 
CO2 tax 
all firms 
EU ETS all 
firms 
CO2 tax 
all firms 
EU ETS  
all firms 
Emissions 5.46e-06 
(1.00) 
4.12e-06** 
(7.09) 
4.32e-06 
(0.79) 
3.75e-06** 
(6.38) 
4.28e-06 
(0.83) 
3.64e-06** 
(5.23) 
Emissions squared -4.07e-12 
(0.55) 
-1.59e-12** 
(6.26) 
-2.53e-12 
(0.37) 
-1.55e-12** 
(6.08) 
-2.74e-12 
(0.40) 
-1.53e-12** 
(5.12) 
Turnover -1.49e-04 
(0.70) 
1.83e-04 
(1.49) 
-1.54e-04 
(0.62) 
-2.98e-05 
(0.26) 
-2.30e-04 
(1.13) 
-1.49e-05 
(0.12) 
# Employees -1.55e-04 
(1.54) 
-1.71e-04** 
(2.97) 
-1.42e-04 
(1.51) 
-6.37e-05 
(1.76) 
-1.22e-04 
(1.25) 
-8.19-05* 
(2.28) 
Double regulation 0.0374 
(0.12) 
0.506** 
(2.88) 
-0.082 
(0.26) 
0.361* 
(2.16) 
0.040 
(0.04) 
0.351 
(1.92) 
Energy sector 0.318 
(1.12) 
0.047 
(0.26) 
0.362 
(1.34) 
0.212 
(1.26) 
0.308 
(1.03) 
0.100 
(0.52) 
Constant 2.490** 
(7.10) 
2.600** 
(14.38) 
1.826** 
(5.28) 
2.274** 
(13.34) 
1.861** 
(5.24) 
2.439** 
(12.26) 
N 60 95 60 95 60 95 
R2 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.27 0.12 0.23 
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the EU ETS as he found that firms with more than 1,000 employees are experiencing larger overall 
transaction costs.  
The regression analysis confirms that the MRV costs under CO2 taxation do not depend on 
emissions. Moreover, control variables that might affect the costs of MRV costs are not statistically 
significant.  
 
5.3 Transaction Costs across Sectors 
As discussed in Section 4, we observe that with regard to the firms in the sample, there is a 
slight over-representation of firms in the energy sector among our respondents, in particular in the 
group of firms that are subject to both regulations. In the energy sector, emissions are driven almost 
entirely by the type and quantity of fuel burned. This means that if the regulator can measure the 
quantity of fuel that enters the chain, they can accurately assess emissions. We might also expect that 
energy firms (which are usually quite large and subject to many environmental regulations in addition 
to those intended to reduce GHG emissions) are less carbon intensive and more efficient in terms of 
administrative procedures, which might affect their MRV costs. Though the regression analysis did 
not show any significant difference in MRV costs between firms in the energy sector and firms in the 
other sectors, in this section we analyze this point more carefully by means of a statistical comparison 
across groups. To this end, in Table 8 we present the CO2 emissions intensity per sector (computed as 
the ratio of CO2 emissions to turnover), the sum of internal and external MRV procedures (in thousand 
EUR), and the cost per ton of emissions. As usual, emissions under CO2 taxation correspond to those 
from fuel combustion and emissions under the EU ETS correspond to the verified emissions. 
Table 8: The MRV Costs in the Energy vs. Non-Energy Sectors 
 CO2 tax all firms  EU ETS all firms CO2 tax vs. EU ETS 
 N Mean N Mean p-value 
Energy Sector  
CO2 intensity (tCO2/th EUR) 35 0.339 54 0.261  
Emissions 35 28 506 54 28 096  
MRV2(thousand EUR) 35 13.8 58 22.8 0.009 
MRV2 €/tCO2 30 0.015 56 29.6 0.001 
Non-Energy Sector  
CO2 intensity (tCO2/th EUR) 30 1.057 44 0.999  
Emissions 30 105 960 44 127 217  
MRV2(thousand EUR) 45 11.9 46 23.6 0.001 
MRV2 €/tCO2 31 0.004 45 47.6 0.001 
Sources: The survey and the authors’ calculations. 
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We can observe that – regardless of the policy in place – the emission intensity of firms is lower 
in the energy sector than in the other sectors. The costs of MRV procedures, however, are slightly 
higher in the energy sector. One explanation for this is the structure of energy firms – usually they run 
several plants located in different locations and this might require additional staff resources for MRV 
procedures. If for the same regulation we compare between sectors (e.g., CO2 tax for energy vs. non-
energy sectors), we find that the differences are only statistically significant for the cost per unit of 
emissions MRV2/tCO2, which is lower in the case of the energy sector whether regulated under CO2 
taxation (p-value = 0.007) or the EU ETS (p-value = 0.000). In contrast, if for the same sector we 
compare between regulations (e.g., CO2 tax vs. EU ETS for the energy sector), we find that the MRV 
costs are statistically higher under the EU ETS in both the energy and non-energy sector (p-values 
reported in the table).  
  In sum, the conclusion of this analysis is that the differences in total MRV costs are driven 
mainly by the policies in place rather than the sectors. 
 
5.5 On the attitudes of the firms towards the transaction costs of the CO2 taxes and EU ETS. 
Besides asking firms about the costs related to MRV activities, our survey included a series of 
questions aimed to unveil firms’ perceptions regarding the evolution of transaction costs over time, as 
well as the extent to which they agree with statements regarding the costs of the regulations. In 
particular, we asked firms whether the MRV costs under CO2 taxation and the EU ETS have 
increased/decreased over time and whether they think that the EU ETS is too burdensome for small 
emitters. The responses to these questions are reported in Table 9. 
Table 9: Responses to the General Statements 
CO2 tax firms EU ETS firms 
 
Agree Indifferent Disagree Agree Indifferent Disagree 
 
In terms of the administrative burden, if our firm was given an opportunity to be regulated by only the 
CO2 tax or the EU ETS, we would prefer the CO2 tax 
45 20 14 61 24 16 
The EU ETS provides stronger incentives for firms to reduce their CO2 emissions than does CO2 
taxation 
23 19 37 30 25 46 
The volatility of the price of the allowances in the EU ETS has provided firm with strong incentives 
to reduce their CO2 emissions 
9 24 47 11 17 74 
The EU ETS is too burdensome for small emitters 
50 21 8 75 13 12 
Sources: The survey and the authors’ calculations. 
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Our results indicate that most firms agree or strongly agree with the statement that the EU ETS 
is too burdensome for small emitters. For instance, out of 79 firms subject to the MRV requirements of 
CO2 taxation that answered this question, 50 agree or strongly agree with this statement. Out of 100 
firms subject to the MRV requirements of the EU ETS that answered this question, 75 agree or 
strongly agree with this statement. Moreover, if given the opportunity to choose to be regulated only 
by the CO2 tax or the EU ETS, most firms would prefer to be regulated through CO2 taxation. The 
share of firms that would prefer to be regulated through CO2 taxation is slightly larger among the 
firms that are currently regulated under the EU ETS (60% vs. 57% in the case of the firms regulated 
through CO2 taxation). These findings might, however, not only be a reflection of the higher 
transactions costs involved in the EU ETS’s MRV procedures, but also indicate a certain degree of 
skepticism regarding the incentives provided by the EU ETS to reduce emissions. For instance, most 
firms do not agree with the statement that the EU ETS provides stronger incentives for firms to reduce 
their CO2 emissions than CO2 taxation. The share of firms that do not agree is about 70% both in the 
case of the firms subject to the CO2 tax and in the case of the firms in the EU ETS. Moreover, firms do 
not believe that the price volatility of the allowances in the EU ETS has provided firms with strong 
incentives to reduce their CO2 emissions. Again, the share of firms that do not agree with this 
statement is approximately the same among the firms subject to the CO2 tax and those in the EU ETS 
at 89%. 
Regarding the evolution of MRV costs over time, out of 39 firms subject to the CO2 tax that 
answered this question, 26 indicated that the costs have not increased while 10 firms responded that 
the costs have increased as a result of new legislation, development of measurement systems and 
procedures, and increased costs of external verification. Out of 56 firms regulated under the EU ETS 
that answered this question, 15 indicated that the costs have not increased while 34 responded that the 
costs have increased due to more stringent requirements for MRV and increased costs of external 
verification. Clearly we have too few observations to draw conclusions. However, the responses do 
suggest that it is more common to believe that the costs of MRV procedures have increased over time 
under the EU ETS than to believe that they have done so under CO2 tax taxation.    
 
6) Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we empirically compared the transaction costs from measurement, reporting, and 
verification between two environmental regulations aimed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions: a carbon dioxide tax and a tradable emissions system. We chose to look at the case of 
Sweden, where a set of firms was for some years covered by both respective regulations – the Swedish 
CO2 tax and the European Union’s Emissions Trading System. This provided us with an excellent case 
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study as it allowed us to disentangle the costs of each regulation from other firm-specific variables that 
might affect the overall cost of MRV procedures. 
In particular, we aimed to answer the following questions: (1) Are firms’ MRV transaction costs 
higher under the EU ETS or CO2 taxation? (2) Do firms’ MRV costs depend on CO2 emissions? (3) 
Are there any learning-by-doing effects on firms’ MRV costs from the interaction of the CO2 tax and 
the EU ETS? And (4), do firms’ MRV costs differ across sectors?  
Our results indicate that the transaction costs are high, especially compared with the actual cost 
of the CO2 tax and the price of the EU ETS permits. This is by all means a surprising finding if one 
considers that most studies analyzing or comparing environmental regulations disregards the role of 
transaction costs. In addition, our results point to different structures of the MRV costs under CO2 
taxation and the EU ETS: Under CO2 taxation the MRV costs do not depend on size while they do in 
the case of the EU ETS. When comparing the costs between policies we find that the costs are 
generally higher under the EU ETS than under CO2 taxation. Moreover, regulation overlap has implied 
duplication of transaction costs compared to what the costs could have been with only one policy in 
place. Since the MRV costs of both policies are high the recommendation is therefore to avoid such 
policy overlap. Furthermore, our results support the implementation of a minimum threshold for actual 
emissions to avoid that the costs of participation outweigh the benefits of being covered by the 
scheme. This threshold should ensure that only installations that emit more than a fixed amount of tons 
CO2/year are covered by the regulations. From our results is clear that such a threshold should be 
larger in the case of the EU ETS. 
A caveat of our analysis is that we compare the costs of two policies in place and hence 
disregard start-up costs that might be quite large in the case of the EU ETS. Moreover, we disregard 
the trading costs under the EU ETS. Including such costs in the analysis could clearly increase the 
wedge between the transaction costs of the studied policies even further. Also, it is important to 
highlight that by buying fuel from authorized warehouse keepers, many firms and final clients pay the 
tax without incurring any MRV costs. Thus, by surveying warehouse keepers we focus on the only 
firms that have MRV costs related to compliance with the CO2 tax. This implies that if we had 
considered the overall coverage of the CO2 tax, the MRV costs per firm or per ton of CO2 would have 
been even smaller.   
All in all, our results confirm the general view that regulating emissions upstream by means of a 
carbon tax decreases transaction costs vis-á-vis downstream regulation by means of emission trading. 
As described in the paper, transaction costs due to MRV will have a negative effective reducing the 
optimal level of emissions’ reductions in the case of both regulations (though the reduction is larger in 
the case of emission trading as the transaction costs are higher than in the case of carbon taxation). 
However, unlike taxes, reducing the stringency of MRV activities will also affect the price of 
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emissions. Indeed, it is well know that (unlike emission taxes), under a trading scheme the price of 
emission permits is affected by the strength of monitoring and enforcement activities. Moreover, the 
permit price influences abatement decisions and therefore the enforcement strategy influences the 
emissions discharge. Thus, the success of an emission trading scheme will certainly depend on the 
strength of MRV. If not properly handled, this can affect the emission price and hence the aggregate 
abatement level achieved by the policy in the long term. Hence, MRV procedures related to emissions 
trading are not only more costly than those related to CO2 taxation but also much needed if the 
regulation is to provide real incentives for polluters to reduce emissions. 
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